Does everyone hate Woollies?

I had a brief email exchange with a journalism student last week, and I thought I would share my views with you (my verrrrry patient readers).

The background is that market research had been recently released indicating 72% of Australians don’t trust Coles or Woolworths and these levels of distrust have gone up since last year.

Q. How do you think Woolworths are faring in the Retail sector/Stock market?

Me:  Woolworths had been a darling of the stockmarket until quite recently.  Their main rival, Coles Myer performed poorly for many years, and Woolworths was much quicker in adopting and adapting ‘best practice’ from offshore (most notably through a close alliance with Wal-Mart).  Much of these practices are on the warehousing/stock management side of things.  Woolworths grew faster than Coles Myer and had better margins.  It made some strong moves in the non-supermarket space – with alcohol sales being particularly strong.

The split up of Coles Myer and the acquisition of the non-Department business by Wesfarmers has negatively affected Woolworths. The revamp of both the Coles supermarket business and K-Mart variety stores have put pressure on Woolworths’ (and Big W’s) margins and curbed their growth.  At the same time, Woolworths has been burnt by the poor performance of the Dick Smith business, and the large investments in a rival to Wesfarmers’ Bunnings are a long way from paying off.

Q. What implications might these figures of the survey have for the company and it’s competitors?

Me: As for the distrust aspect, this is far from surprising.  The supermarket sector in Australia is one of the most concentrated in the world.  The attempts by both Coles and Woolworths to further squeeze suppliers (as part of the drive to improve margins) have coincided with a period of perceived price inflation (although I’m not convinced the latter is actually occurring).

Consumers have apparently resigned themselves to the idea that these two duopolists are not really competing too hard. Stories of struggling suppliers seem to have fuelled this animosity.

But like the big banks, I’m not sure customer dissatisfaction will genuinely translate into consumer action.  There is a strong tendency to ‘stick around’ while grumbling.  Any incursion by Aldi (or to a much lesser extent Costco) is unlikely to have a big impact given the sheer weight of numbers (in terms of stores and ease of accessibility).

What do you lot think?

See Dick jump, see Dick rant

Perennial soundbite provider Dick Smith has been very vocal in the past couple of days about the prospect of his namesake retail business falling into ‘foreign hands’. Despite him selling the electronics chain to Woolworth’s two decades ago, he is threatening to ‘trash the brand‘ if some foreign mob tries to buy it.

The logic he throws around on this (and other ‘buy Australian’ campaigns) is spurious at best.  It is very unclear why so much importance is placed on the specific ownership structure of such businesses.  Perhaps it reflects Dick’s own background as a business owner (and therefore someone who derived their income from the ‘surplus’ or profits of the firm). But for almost all stakeholders in the firm, and the overall health of the economy, the question of the location of the major shareholders (and principal decision-makers) should be of little importance.

Consider the Dick Smith Electronics case.

The firm operate 433 stores across Australia and NZ (we’ll get back to this Trans-Tasman dimension in a second), and made $1.8b in sales last year.  The economic and societal impact on Australia of these operations is most heavily felt in terms of the 5300+ employees and the wages they earn (and then spend/invest), the flow of moneys to landlords, supply chain participants and other ancillary service providers.  The ‘earnings’ of the firm (i.e. the ‘surplus’ or ‘profit extracted by Woolworth’s) last year was a paltry $20m or so.

If Dick Smith Electronics were sold to a non-Australian entity, they would be buying the right to extract such profit, but also taking on the role of paying a wages bill that presumably exceeds $250m, and feeding through a lot of income to the other parts of the Dick Smith sphere of activity.  The firm would still pay taxes, rents, and provide consumers with access to products. The firm might remit profits offshore, but it’s just as likely said profits would be reinvested in Australian in an attempt to improve the business and its performance. This is hardly a case of ‘selling the farm’.

There is also one clearly irreconcilable contradiction in the jingoistic rants of Smith and other mercantilists: outward foreign direct investment.

If the logic says Aussie interests are hurt by any sort of inward investment (e.g. by acquisitions of local firms by big bad foreign folks), then surely any instance when an Australian firm expands offshore is similarly deleterious to the host nation. Where was Dick when his namesake firm made their imperialistic entre into NZ?  And when they signed agreements to ally with Tata in India?

Dueling Duopolists, or, who should we cheer for when bullies battle?

The Aussie news headlines have been buzzing in recent days with the competing cries of our embattled brewers and the ‘on the side of the consumer’ supermarket giants, over an alleged effort by the latter to sell the majors’ beers as ‘loss leaders’.  See here and here for a reasonable summary.

This is the latest staple product to get this sort of a run (after milk and petrol) as Woolworths and the revitalised Coles (as part of Wesfarmers) engage in some much-missed competition.  Of course, it isn’t competition via ‘across the board’ price cuts, but, rather, through trying to switch buying preferences from one chain to the other (utilising the grocer’s associated liquor chains).

And poor old Foster’s (and presumably the much quieter Lion Nathan) are worried that this (alleged) predatory pricing will hurt their margins, and those of independent liquor retailers.

The reality of all this is that we’re talking about two pairs of behemoths locking horns, and competition here is a very different beast to that envisaged in perfect markets.  Look at the numbers:

- Foster’s (48% market share) and Lion Nathan (44%) amount to 92 percent of the Aussie beer market

- Woolworths and Coles/Wesfarmers amount to roughly 50% of the Aussie liquor retailing market (with most other sales through small, independent retailers)

- Woolworths (around 40%) and Coles/Wesfarmers  (around 35%) amount to roughly 75% of the Aussie grocery market

Those are the sort of market shares we called oligopolistic, or indeed duopolistic, with competition often reaching a calm equilibrium through effective price signalling and/or maintenance of market share.

Foster’s are kicking and screaming, however, due to concerns about the buying power of the two retail giants. Now, if Foster’s had a significant retail arm it might be able to curb such a threat (and earn more of those nice rents from the duopoly power).

But back in 2003 the brewer sold off Australian Liquor and Hospitality Group (ALH), which operated 131 hotels and 109 bottle shops. ALH now runs 285 licensed venues and over 450 retail liquor outlets.  And guess who now owns 75% ALH… Woolworths.  It seems Foster’s handed Woolworths the stick it is now being beaten with.

There’s talk that this behaviour will all come under the scrutiny of some eagle-eyed politicians in Canberra in the coming weeks.  Now, we’d hope they know a lot about duopolies (i.e. systems with two powerful parties)…

Wal-Mart with a Target on its back

Regular readers may remember a guest-post back in July about the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Tom argued that BP might well be copping a disproportionate amount of blame for the disaster, while lesser partners were getting off lately.  We described this as an instance of diseconomies of scale.

The Wall-Street Journal raised a further example last week (click through from this link for the full version of the article).

The article argues (and some trade union officials admit) that the world’s largest retailer Wal-Mart receives excessive scrutiny for its labour practices (i.e. it’s non-union status, low pays, miserly health benefits etc), while counterpart Target (the US firm, not the Aussie one) get off very lightly, despite having very similar employment conditions.

This manifests as a genuine disadvantage for Wal-Mart as public campaigns against new stores (especially in large cities) restrict expansion.

Meanwhile, Target appears to be deliberately, well, targetting the same neighbourhoods conscious of the lack of scrutiny, the perception of being the ‘lesser of two evils’, and the limited resources of campaigners.

Building such disadvantages into our understanding of competitive advantage, firm growth, and bargaining power seems increasingly important.

Fostering a Chinese wine giant?

While we all wait eagerly to see who might buy up the soon-to-be-untangled Foster’s beer business (see this piece for a recent update of the contenders), it is possible that the more fascinating and globally significant acquisition might actually occur on the wine side of the company’s separation.

An Australian article last month got me looking into the prospect of a Chinese takeover of some or all of the forthcoming wine business (renamed as Treasury Wine Estates).  The article mentions that China’s Bright Foods, failed bidder for CSR’s sugar business, has sounded out Foster’s about the firm’s “Hunter Valley operations focused on the blue-chip Rosemount brand”.

I was a little unclear on the size and scale of China’s wine market.  I have certainly heard the usual extravagant claims that it could be an enormous untapped opportunity for Australian exporters, but what I was unaware of was the actual scale of existing domestic production.

According to this academic study China is already the 6th largest producer of wine in the world (at 13,005m hectalitres in 2008).  That’s more than Australia (11,700m), South Africa (9,890m), Chile (7,860m) and NZ (1,700m).  Chinese production grew 17% between 2004-8, while pretty much all ahead and around them on the list experienced pretty hefty declines in volumes (e.g. Australia fell 20%, France 25%).

Certainly China is not currently a significant exporter of wine (unlike most of the other major producer nations), and the initial focus of any foreign acquisitions will likely be on servicing the Chinese market with higher quality imports.

The longer-term picture is where it gets interesting, however. Picking up a firm with strong international brands (which Bright Foods would certainly be doing if they secured some/all of Treasury) would allow the Chinese firm to build up much-needed expertise in marketing and distributing beyond Chinese shores.

This could well be the birth of a new wine giant.

(As an aside, there is an unfortunate irony to the possibility of a big chunk of Foster’s shifting into Chinese hands, as the firm had a very torrid time from 1993-2006 trying to build a beer presence in the country).